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Using takeover rumors as informed trading events, this paper investigates dark pool trading 
characteristics as well as the influence of dark pool activity on the price impact in open markets. 
We find that dark pool participation impacts return, volatility and bid–ask spread of the rumored 
takeover targets. A closer examination of the trading venues reveals that as the relative trading 
volume in dark pools increases, the price discovery in the dark pool also sees a marginal increase. 
Interestingly, most of the permanent price impact seems to emanate from small size trades. A 
possible explanation could be that because of the low execution probability in dark pools, informed 
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1. Introduction  
Alternative trading systems (ATSs) flourished after the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) accepted the Regulation National Market System in 2005. In 2015, around 18 
percent of total dollar volume of the market was traded on ATS.1 According to the SEC, dark pools 
are a type of alternative trading system (ATS) that does not provide order information to the public. 
Dark pools were initially designed for investors to trade large blocks of shares without 
facing the adverse price pressure created by their trade. To protect market stability, dark pools 
enable anonymous trading. Anonymity prevents a large trade from drawing too much attention, 
and thus avoids significant price impact. However, on the flip side, the same anonymity also has 
the potential to hide information and thereby adversely affect price discovery. Furthermore, this 
adverse effect may not remain contained to the dark pool. It can harm the price discovery process 
of the open market by absorbing too many trades and liquidity from non-dark pool venues. Buti, 
Rindi and Werner (2011) show that when dark pools are introduced, traders reduce the size of their 
orders in the Limit Order Book and switch to dark pools. They found that even though the combined 
total volume in the Limit Order Book and the dark pool increased, the increase was largely driven 
by the increased trading on the dark pool venue. Consistent with this, Nimalendran and Ray (2013) 
suggest that trades in dark pools provide less information to the open market and therefore, 
potentially informed traders are likely to break their orders across dark pools and open markets. Ye 
(2011) finds that dark pools hurt price discovery and increase volatility and that the execution 
probability and competitiveness of dark pools are reduced by informed trading. However, some 
other more recent studies make contradictory assertions. Zhu (2014) points out that dark pools 
improve price discovery in the open market. Zhu (2014)  argues that informed orders are 
positively correlated with each other and therefore, informed traders are likely to trade in the same 
direction as the market. To the extent that this is likely to lower the execution probability, it is 
likely to push informed traders into the open market. As more informed investors trade in open 
markets, the noise on the exchange reduces and the price discovery ability of the open market 
improves. 
                                                 
1 Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73639, p.55 (Nov. 19, 2014) 
(noting that “based on data collected from ATSs pursuant to FINRA Rule 4552 for 18 weeks of trading in 2014, the 
trading volume of ATSs accounted for approximately 18 percent of the total dollar volume in NMS stocks, with no 
individual ATS executing more than five percent”). 
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This paper uses M&A rumors as an exogenous information event to examine the influence 
of dark pool trading on price impact in open markets. We investigate whether the relative trading 
volume in dark pools adversely impact the price discovery process in the open market. To answer 
this question, we perform several event studies. Instead of using acquisition announcements, we 
use takeover rumors as the events. Compared to acquisition announcements, which typically lead 
to abnormal returns and high volatility before the announcement due to information leakage, 
rumors are more unexpected and hence, should give us a better picture of the impact of dark pools. 
Ahern and Sosyura (2015) examine takeover rumors from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2011 
and show that the target firm experiences a 4.3% abnormal stock return on the publication day of 
the initial takeover rumor. Chou, Tian and Yin (2010) show the price of takeover rumor targets 
moves 42 days before the takeover rumor occurs. In contrast, for acquisition announcements, 
Huang and Walking (1987) show the takeover target firm gains a 9.3% abnormal return on the 
initial acquisition announcement day. Betton and Eckbo (2000) find the price of acquisition targets 
starts to move upward 60 days prior to the takeover announcement. Many previous studies find 
pre-bid run-up in the price of takeover target stocks. Comment and Jarrell (1987) find that from 
1984 to 1989, shareholders received a 50 percent return on the price of stocks that were traded 
before tender offers. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) study how markets anticipate tender offers and find 
that pre-bid run-up anticipates around 40 percent of takeover premiums.  
We attempt to link open market performance with relative trading volume in dark pools. 
Four aspects of a stock—return, abnormal return, volatility and bid–ask spread—are used to 
measure market performance in light of rumors. We want to know whether the relative dark pool 
trading volume of a stock associated with an acquisition rumor significantly impacts these four 
aspects on the event date. Our methodology closely follows Barclay and Warner (1993). We 
classify the transactions in dark pools and open markets into several categories based on trading 
size. Our results are consistent with the findings of Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003) 
that informed traders in dark pools prefer small trades. With the rapid development of algorithmic 
trading, block traders and informed traders can reduce their transaction costs by slicing large orders 
into smaller ones over time. Hendershott and Jones (2011) suggest that institutions would use 
algorithmic trading to gradually accumulate or dispose shares. Hendershott and Riordan (2013) 
find that institutional investors trade large block shares in small lots gradually over time, and 
minimize the transaction cost with the help of algorithms. Further investigation finds that the dark 
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pool price discovery does not seem to be related either to the accuracy of the rumor, or, to the 
fundamentals of the firm. In contrast to the dark pool results, we find that the price discovery 
process in the open market does depend on both the accuracy of the rumor and the fundamental 
characteristics of the firm. To the extent that there are no market makers in the dark pool, a possible 
interpretation of these results may be that informed investors in dark pools do not react similarly 
to information because of the poor liquidity. We also find some evidence suggesting that the 
percentage of price discovery in dark pools increases along with growth in the relative trading 
volume in dark pools. This means that greater price discovery emanates from dark pools as the 
relative trading volume in dark pools increases. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we review the previous 
studies related to dark pools and rumors. In Section 3, we describe the data used in the paper. In 
Section 4, we analyze the effect of dark pools on open market performance. In Section 5, we 
provide the trading distribution of both venues under various criteria. We conclude in Section 6. 
2. Literature review  
2.1 Dark pools 
Many existing theories investigate the characteristic of dark pools and how they influence 
overall market quality. Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) find that prices concentrate more quickly in 
transparent markets and that the level of market transparency has a crucial influence on market 
equilibria, benefitting traders and market makers. Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2015) suggest that 
the transparency of trading venue impacts the benefits for informed traders. Boni, Brown and Leach 
(2012) show that large trades in dark pools are insignificantly correlated with returns and drive a 
lower volatility increase. Comparing dark pools to open markets, Buti, Rindi and Werner (2011) 
suggest that when dark pools are introduced, traders favor them to the Limit Order Book; thus, the 
volume in the Limit Order Book always decreases, even when the total volume of both the Limit 
Order Book and dark pools is raised. Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) provides evidence 
suggesting that alternative trading systems have lower realized execution costs than systems 
relying on brokers. Finally, Degryse, Jong and Kervel (2014) suggest that market liquidity is 
enhanced by the competition of lit and dark venues. 
Extant studies remain contradictory on whether dark pools hurt price discovery in open 
markets. Ye (2011) finds that the existence of dark pools reduces price discovery ability of open 
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markets. Klöck, Schied and Sun (2011) analyzed dark pool regularity and find that dark pools may 
lead to market inefficiencies and decreased value-finding. On the other hand, Zhu (2014) points 
out that even when the liquidity of exchanges is damaged by the existence of dark pools, price 
discovery improves. Buti, Rindi, Wen and Werner (2011) examine stock depth, spreads and short-
term volatility and show that high dark pool participation improves market quality. Furthermore, 
Mizuta et al. (2015) indicate that dark pools can prevent large market impact and stabilized prices.  
 
2.2 Takeover rumors  
Extensive prior literature explains the positive abnormal return on targets of takeover 
rumors. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) find that markets react to takeover rumor information 
efficiently, while Keown and Pinkerton (1981) prove that pre-announcement trading is based on 
takeover rumors and that inside information always leaks before the announcement. Chou, Tian 
and Yin (2010) find that the stock price run-up before a rumor’s publication predicts the accuracy 
of the rumor, and Ahern and Sosyura (2015) show that rumors from journalists who have superior 
experience or specialization in the corresponding industry strongly predict the takeover 
announcement. Betton, Davis, and Walker (2017) find that the justification behind the takeover 
rumor is significantly correlated with rumor accuracy as well as short and long-run abnormal 
returns. Engelberg, Joseph and Parsons (2011) show that the existence and timing of local media 
reporting greatly affect local trading. Similarly, Liu, Smith and Syed (1990), after studying the 
“Heard on the Street” section of The Wall Street Journal, report positive abnormal returns 10 days 
prior to the date information becomes public. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) and Zivney, Bertin 
and Torabzadeh (1996) also investigate takeover rumors in The Wall Street Journal and find that, 
on average, takeover rumor target firms experience approximately seven percent excess returns 
during the twenty trading day period before the rumor is published. Clarksona, Joyceb and Tutticcia 
(2006) analyze intraday data and find high trading volume and high abnormal returns on a stock in 
the 10-minutes time interval immediately after the takeover rumor is posted on the Internet. 
Furthermore, Bommel (2003) suggest that when rumors occur, the stock price moves and informed 





3. Data collection 
3.1 The takeover rumor data  
We use the rumor data of Betton, Davis, and Walker (2017) and subsequently define a 
rumor as any publicly available conjecture that explicitly claims that a public U.S. firm recorded 
in the Centre for Research in Security Price (CRSP) database is a potential acquisition target. To 
guarantee public awareness of the conjecture, the information also has to be reported in business 
journals, publications or the media. Therefore, rumor data was collected from S&P Takeover Talk, 
S&P Capital IQ, Zephyr, plus two online databases, Factiva and Pro-Quest, which collect reports 
from various leading publications, including The Wall Street Journal, Business Week, The 
Economist, Bloomberg and Dow Jones Newswires. Rumors were collected using a proprietary 
algorithm containing the keywords “strategic alternative”, “buyout”, “sale of the firm”, “looking 
to be acquired”, “takeover candidate”, “takeover chatter” and other sets of takeover terms to 
identify rumors.  
Furthermore, the rumors collected represent the initial (‘scoop’) publication, ensuring no 
similar public conjectures within the previous 180 days. If a rumor does not occur on a trading day, 
we adjust the event date to the next trading day. Of their complete sample of 2074 takeover rumors, 
we identify 1,279 rumors announced between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010 which 
comprise the full sample for this study since dark pool trading has truly flourished after 2005.  
3.2 The dark pool trading data 
We collect the dark pool intraday trading data from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database, 
which gives us transactions across dark pools and exchanges. The dark pool trading sample 
includes the stocks recorded in the CRSP database from January 3, 2006 to December 31, 2010.  
To distinguish dark pool trades from transactions settled in exchanges, we use the TAQ 
exchange code to classify trades in dark pools, as represented by the letter “D” in the TAQ database. 
4. The performance of open markets under different levels of dark pool participation 
To uncover how dark pools impact market performance, we design a set of variables to 
capture the relative performance of the two markets (dark pool versus the open market). We select 
four variables—return, abnormal return, volatility and bid–ask spread—to report the performance 
of the market. Return and abnormal return measure the reaction of the market to takeover rumors. 
Previous studies indicate that rumors drive significant abnormal returns for acquisition targets. We 
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examine the return and the abnormal return in the open market and contrast it with that in the dark 
pool to understand the price discovery in the two venues. Volatility measures the fluctuation and 
range of prices. We are investigating the prices around an information event (M&A rumors). 
Arrival of new information in the market and the price discovery process that follows it is likely to 
increase the volatility in the market. Therefore, we expect stock prices to become more volatile and 
the stock’s price range to widen in the face of rumors. Close examination of the volatility of prices 
on the open market and the dark pool allows us to develop a better understanding of the price 
discovery process and the role of the dark pool. We also use the bid–ask spread to measure market 
liquidity and information asymmetry. Arrival of new information in the market should lead to 
widening of the bid-ask spread. As the price discovery process evolves, the spread should gravitate 
towards its pre-information levels. If dark pools are adversely affecting the price discovery process, 
then we would expect that the bid-ask spreads would take longer to return to their pre-event levels. 
A crucial variable of interest in this paper is dark pool participation. To remove the size 
effect of different stocks, we capture dark pool participation by calculating the relative trading 
volume in dark pools. Following Tkac (1996) and Lo and Wang (2000), we define relative trading 
volume in dark pools as: 
𝑅𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡/(𝑉𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) 
Where 𝑅𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the relative trading volume in dark pools, 𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the daily dollar trading 
volume in dark pools and 𝑉𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the daily dollar trading volume in open markets for stock i on 
event date t. 
Return is the daily return of the stock on the event date. Abnormal returns are calculated by 
subtracting the estimated return, measured by the market model, from the actual return on the event 
date. The event date is the rumor date or the closest trading day after the rumor date, if the rumor 
day is not a trading day. To avoid material event impact, we would like to choose an estimate 
window containing minimal important public information. As the takeover rumor data already 
selected the rumor without public conjecture within the previous 180 days, daily returns for 50 
trading days, which cover the period t-100 though t-50, are used to estimate the market model 
parameters, where day t represents the event date for the security. The abnormal return of a security 
on day t is calculated as the difference between the actual return and the estimated return of the 
market model as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
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Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the exact return and 𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the estimated 
return, as calculated by the market model for stock i on event date t. 
We measure daily volatility by calculating the natural logarithm of the price range on the 
event date. Rather than compute the dispersion of the price, this measurement provides the scope 
of price movement on the event date. Following Parkinson (1980), the trading volatility of a stock 





Where 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is trading volatility, 𝑃𝐻,𝑖,𝑡 is the highest trading price and 𝑃𝐿,𝑖,𝑡 is the lowest 
trading price for stock i on event date t.  
To the extent that the quoted bid-ask spread is a function of the stock price, we use relative 
bid spread (RS) in this study. In order to avoid issues of bid-ask bounce, we use quote mid-point 
instead of the transaction price. Therefore, daily relative bid–ask spread is defined as the bid–ask 





Where 𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is the relative bid–ask spread, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  is the bid–ask spread at market 
close and 𝑀𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the quote mid-point at market close for stock i on event date t. 
Summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1. The t statistics indicate that 
return, abnormal return, volatility and bid–ask spread are all significantly different from zero. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Gupta and Misra (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Clarkson, Joyce and Tutticci (2006), Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008), Jain and Sunderman 
(2014), and Betton, Davis, and Walker (2017) that takeover rumors have substantial impact on 
stock price.  
To explore the impact of dark pools, we run several linear regressions that treat the relative 
volume in dark pools as the independent variable. Cornett et al. (2011) investigated both firm and 
industry level variables, which are used to predict takeover candidacy. By incorporating the control 
variables mentioned in Cornett et al. (2011), and the dummy variable takeover announced within 
six months, which indicates whether the takeover rumor comes true within six months, we control 
for firm and industry fundamentals and rumor accuracy which are factors that may impact market 
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performance. Following Cornett et al. (2011), we use the following model to explore the impact of 
dark pools on the trading environment in the market: 
𝑃𝐼𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅𝑉 + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘) + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡ 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽4 ∗ (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽5
∗ (𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒⁡ 𝑖𝑛⁡ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽6 ∗ (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽7 ∗ (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)
+ 𝛽8 ∗ (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒⁡ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ⁡ 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ) + 𝛽9 ∗ (𝑅𝑂𝐴) + 𝛽10
∗ (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒⁡ 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟) + 𝛽11 ∗ (𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ⁡ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 𝛽12 ∗ (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠⁡ 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽13
∗ (𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡⁡ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑) + 𝛽14 ∗ (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡ 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝) + 𝛽15
∗ (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡ 𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦) + 𝛽16
∗ (𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟⁡ 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑑⁡ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛⁡ 𝑠𝑖𝑥⁡ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) + 𝜀 
Where 𝑃𝐼𝑃 is price impact proxies which are return, abnormal return, volatility and bid-
ask spread, 𝑅𝑉 is the relative trading volume in dark pools, 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 is the absolute value 
of the difference between the two-year median industry sales growth and the two-year median sales 
growth for all firms in the sample, 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡ 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 is square of sales shock,⁡ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the 
log of total assets, 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒⁡ 𝑖𝑛⁡ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the percentage change in the book value of assets of the 
firm in the last two years, 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is the change in the firm's net sales in the last two years, 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is the ratio of sales of the largest four firms (in terms of sales) to total 
industry sales, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒⁡ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ⁡ 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ is a dummy variable equal to one if i) sales growth 
for a firm in the last two years is less than the industry median and long-term debt ratio is greater 
than the industry median, or ii) if sales growth in the last two years is greater than the industry 
median and long-term debt ratio is less than the industry median, and zero otherwise, 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the 
ratio of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring) items to total assets, 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒⁡ 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 
is the ratio of the number of shares of stock traded for the firm to the total shares 
outstanding,⁡ 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ⁡ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is the ratio of cash to total assets.⁡ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠⁡ 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑠 counts the number 
of times a firm proposes or receives a merger bid in the prior two years,⁡ 𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡⁡ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 is the 
number of months since the last merger in the industry (industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level), 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡ 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝  is the percentage change in a firm's stock price in the prior two years, 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡ 𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦 is a dummy variable equal to one if the market-to-book ratio is higher 
than the industry median and share turnover is lower than to the industry median and zero otherwise, 
𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟⁡ 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑑⁡ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛⁡ 𝑠𝑖𝑥⁡ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 is a dummy variable equal to one if the rumor target 
involved in an actual acquisition in six months. Appendix A gives the description of all control 
variables used in these regressions. 
9 
 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 2, where model 1 shows the results of 
the regression that includes only the control variables and model 2 gives the results of the full 
regressions. The adjusted R-squared of these four regressions all increase when adding the variable 
relative volume in dark pools, which is positively significant in all of the full regressions. These 
results indicate that when experiencing high levels of dark pool participation, a stock’s return, 
abnormal return, volatility and bid–ask spread increase accordingly. A stock with high dark pool 
participation tends to enlarge both the stock return and abnormal return when a takeover rumor is 
first published. That stock volatility and bid–ask spread rise along with relative volume in dark 
pools reveals that price discovery in open markets is harmed by a high level of participation in dark 
pools. Basically, markets search for the right price within a wide range, and investors are unwilling 
to buy (or sell) a stock at a higher (or lower) price because of a lack of market liquidity when they 
do not know the appropriate stock price. Therefore, adding dark pools alongside open markets 
influences price discovery in open markets. 
The significance of the variable takeover announced within six months agrees with the 
findings in previous studies that rumor accuracy impacts the open market stock performance on 
the event date. However, when testing the correlation between the relative volume in dark pools 
and the variable takeover announced within six months, we find the correlation coefficient to be -
0.025. Contrasting this negative coefficient with the positive correlation observed between the 
relative volume in open markets and the variable Takeover announced within six months seems to 
suggest that the association between rumor credibility and informed trading seems to differ across 
the trading venues. 
When we consider that investors in open markets have strong reactions to accurate rumors, 
despite possessing knowledge inferior to informed dark pool traders, it seems unlikely that this 
difference is caused by the incautiousness of dark pool investors. With the absence of market 
makers, orders in dark pools are far more difficult to execute than those in open markets; thus, 
informed traders are not always able to transact as many shares as they want. Therefore, informed 
traders in dark pools may be unable to react strongly to accurate rumors, even if they would like 
to. We examine this explanation further in the following part of this paper.  
10 
 
5. Price movement in both dark pools and open markets under different levels of dark pool 
participation 
We further examine the cumulative price change of a stock in dark pools and open markets 
on the event date following the methodology used in Barclay and Warner (1993). Barclay and 
Warner (1993) study the typical trading size of informed traders and find that maximum price 
discovery takes place in trades of 500 to 10,000 shares. They define the percentage of the 
cumulative price change for a given firm as the sum of all stock price changes occurring on trades 
in a given size category divided by the total cumulative price change over the event period. We 
follow this definition and examine price discovery primarily according to trading venue rather than 
trading size.  
Table 3 gives the trading distributions in both dark pools and open markets and the 
corresponding percentage of cumulative price change in different trading size categories. When 
calculating the mean percentage of total share volume and the mean percentage of cumulative price 
change, we eliminate the size effect of different stocks be giving these two values equally weighted 
averages.  
We find that despite relative trading volume being lower in the small trading size category 
than the medium trading size category in dark pools, most cumulative price change occurs in small 
trades, mainly of 100 shares. This indicates that small trades have the largest effect on prices in 
dark pools. This result is quite different from the findings of Barclay and Warner (1993) but 
consistent with those of Zhu (2014) and Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003). The 
difference in price impact across order sizes might be caused by diverse trading motivations of 
investors in different size categories. Since Armstrong, Core, Taylor and Verrecchia (2011) 
indicate that informed traders have a greater impact on price due to superior information, we 
believe stock price is mainly moved by informed traders. This may manifest itself more in small 
trades as Caskey, Hughes and Liu (2015) show that informed traders tend to hide their positions 
by splitting large orders into small slices. The development of algorithmic trading further 
strengthens the preference for small trades. The majority of algorithmic strategies and trades focus 
on reducing transaction costs (Hendershott and Jones, 2011; Hendershott and Riordan, 2013; Shen, 
2013; Shen and Yu, 2014). To reduce these costs, a large order is sliced into small pieces and 
offered progressively. Institutional traders, in particular, prefer algorithmic trading because it 
allows them to minimize transaction costs.  
11 
 
We also find the majority of price change still occurs in open markets. This finding confirms 
the results of previous studies that compared to orders on exchanges, off-exchange orders contain 
less information (Jiang, McInish and Upson, 2011; Zhu, 2014; Degryse, Jong and Kervel, 2014; 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2015). Zhu (2014) finds that informed traders like to trade in the 
same direction as the market, which lowers execution probability in dark pools. By contrast, 
liquidity orders are uncorrelated with each other and trade on different sides of the market; thus, in 
dark pools, liquidity orders tend to have higher execution probabilities than informed orders. 
Because execution in open markets is assured by market makers, the percentage of trading volume 
for small trades in dark pools is lower than that percentage in open markets.  
Table 4 and Table 5 use firm size and return on assets (ROA) as the quantile study criteria 
and find that cumulative price changes are non-proportional to trading volume, which holds for 
different firm sizes and ROA categories. The percentage of total share volume and the percentage 
of total cumulative price change for different firm sizes and ROA quantiles are similar. Therefore, 
firm size and ROA have no impact on investor behavior in dark pools; informed traders use the 
same strategy to maximize their benefits and unable to react to the fundamentals of the company.  
We then examine dark pool performance in light of both accurate and inaccurate rumors. A 
rumor leading to a real takeover announcement within the next six months is considered an accurate 
rumor at six months and a rumor leading to a real takeover announcement within one year is 
considered an accurate rumor at one year. Table 6 gives the market conditions for both accurate 
and inaccurate rumors. The differences in the percentage of total share volume and total cumulative 
price change under these four situations are not significant, consistent with our hypothesis that 
because of the liquidity conditions in dark pools, informed traders in dark pools cannot suitably 
react to rumors whether accurate or inaccurate.  
To test whether dark pool participation levels influence the percentage of cumulative price 
change in both lit and dark venues, we divide the observations into four groups, based on the 
quantile of relative trading volume in dark pools, and examine the trading distributions. Table 7 
presents the percentage of cumulative price change under different quantiles of the relative trading 
volume in dark pools and the open market. 
The percentage of cumulative price change in dark pools rises along with the growth of 
trading volume in dark pools. As the relative trading volume in dark pools increases, greater price 
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discovery emanates from the dark pool. This price discovery mainly comes from small trades. This 
result reinforces our opinion that adding dark pools influences the price impact in open markets. 
We present the repeat tests across the time horizon in Table 8 and Figure 1 and find that the 
trading volume in dark pools rose between 2006 and 2010. Generally speaking, the percentage of 
total share volume and total cumulative price change in dark pools increased during this period and 
stabilized after 2008. This trend suggests that dark pools have become more attractive to investors. 
We also find the total share volume in dark pools in 2007 increased while the cumulative price 
change decreased compared to 2006. To further explore this unusual decrease, instead of using the 
equal weighted average, we consider the size effect and utilize the value-weighted average of 
trading volume in both dark pools and the open market. Table 9 and Figure 2 present the results 
using the value-weighted average. In 2007, the percentage of the value-weighted trading volume 
of small trades in dark pools decreased, which means that investors, especially institutional 
investors, tended to make transactions in open markets in that year. This unusual decrease might 
have been caused by the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Because there are no market makers in dark 
pools, orders in dark pools might not get executed. This execution probability is decreased further 
when considering that informed traders in dark pools generally like to trade in the same direction 
under material information. In a financial crisis, this trading preference of informed traders 
increases and pushes them to settle their orders on open markets. Therefore, the equal weighted 
average cumulative price change in dark pools in 2007 was relatively lower. 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we look at the influence of dark pool activity on price impact in open markets 
and at dark pool trading characteristics in light of rumors. Rumors are used as events because they 
are considered unexpected material information. We find that the relative trading volume in dark 
pools is strongly and positively correlated with daily return, abnormal return, volatility and the bid–
ask spread of a stock on the event date. This result indicates that dark pool participation 
significantly impacts the performance of open markets. Furthermore, we find dark pool 
participation is negatively correlated with rumor accuracy. Given dark pools have low market 
liquidity and the performance of the open market under various takeover rumor and company 
fundamental conditions differs greatly. we conclude that investors in dark pools are unable to 
appropriately respond to credible information. Increased dark pool participation also drives high 
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stock volatility and bid–ask spread, which means that markets search for the right price within a 
wider range and investors are unwilling to buy (or sell) the stock at a higher (or lower) price because 
of a lack of market liquidity, given their imperfect knowledge of the appropriate stock price. 
Evidence from trading volume and cumulative price change in different trading size 
categories in dark pools reveals that even though the trading volume of small trades is lower than 
or close to that of medium trades, most cumulative price change occurs on small trades. This 
suggests that because of the low execution probability of dark pools, informed traders prefer to 
slice their orders into small pieces in light of takeover rumors. This phenomenon also holds in 
multiple situations. The quantile study results indicate that the price impacts of dark pools on the 
open market remain similar, despite differences in rumor accuracy, firm size and firm ROA 
conditions. This confirms our previous finding that investors in dark pools are restricted from 
reacting to rumor information. Overall, the undifferentiated price impact of dark pools on open 
markets under multiple situations indicates that although informed traders are likely to fully utilize 
their private information and set their positions in every trading venue, dark pools cannot execute 
orders in a short period of time because they lack market makers.  
We also find that the percentage of cumulative price change in dark pools rises along with 
the growth of trading volume in dark pools. As the relative trading volume in dark pools increases, 
greater price discovery emanates from dark pools. In this case, dark pools absorb market liquidity, 
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The definition of the control variables used in the empirical analyses. These definitions, except 




Sales shock The absolute value of the difference between the two-year median 
industry sales growth and the two-year median sales growth for all 
firms in the sample 
Sales shock squared Square of sales shock 
Size The log of total assets 
Change in size The percentage change in the book value of assets of the firm in the 
last two years. 
Sales growth The change in the firm's net sales in the last two years. 




A dummy variable equal to one if i) sales growth for a firm in the last 
two years is less than the industry median and long-term debt ratio is 
greater than the industry median, or ii) if sales growth in the last two 
years is greater than the industry median and long-term debt ratio is 
less than the industry median, and zero otherwise. 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
The ratio of net income before extraordinary (or nonrecurring) items 
to total assets. 
Share turnover Ratio of the number of shares of stock traded for the firm to the total 
shares outstanding. 
Cash ratio Ratio of cash to total assets. 
Previous mergers Counts the number of times a firm proposes or receives a merger bid 
in the prior two years. 
Dormant period The number of months since the last merger in the industry (industry 
is defined at the 3-digit SIC level). 
Price run-up Percentage change in a firm's stock price in the prior two years. 
Information 
asymmetry 
Dummy variable equal to one if the market-to-book ratio is higher 
than the industry median and share turnover is lower than to the 
industry median and zero otherwise. 
Takeover announced 
within six months 
Dummy variable equal to one if the rumor target involved in an 










Summary statistics on market performance variables on the event date. 
For each individual stock, Return is calculated by the close to close stock return; abnormal return 
is measured by a market model; volatility is Parkinson range volatility; bid-ask spread is the bid –
ask quote at the market close; and relative trading volume in dark pool is the proportion of total 






Moments  Return AR Volatility Spread Relative 
Volume 
N 1238 1238 1238 1238 1238 
Mean 0.042 0.040 0.032 0.004 0.277 
Std. Deviation  0.114 0.112 0.034 0.016 0.143 
Variance 0.013 0.013 0.001 2×10-4 0.021 
Skewness 11.761 11.913 4.393 13.195 0.350 
Kurtosis 268.710 271.799 32.499 245.552 0.771 
75% Q3 0.0639 0.059 0.039 0.002 0.360 
Median 0.023 0.019 0.023 9.8×10-4 0.275 
25% Q1 0 -7×10-4 0.014 4.7×10-4 0.191 
t value 13.066 12.492 34.038 8.913 67.952 




















OLS regressions of return, abnormal return, volatility and bid-ask spread. Model 1 provides the 
result of the regressions only include control variables. Model 2 gives the result of the regressions 
adding the variable relative trading volume in dark pool on Model 1.  
*To facilitate understanding, coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
 Return AR 


















































































































































N 1053 1053 1053 1053 
R-squared 0.04298 0.05236 0.04439 0.05326 
Adjusted R-
squared 






Table 2  
Continued 
 
 Volatility Spread 















































































































































N 1053 1053 1053 1053 
R-squared 0.1842 0.195 0.3111 0.3186 
Adjusted R-
squared 









Mean percentage of total share volume and mean percentage of total cumulative stock-price change 
by trade size in different venues. Summary results of trades classified as small (100 to 400 shares), 
medium (500 to 9900 shares), and large (10000 shares and over) are in bold. Sample: 1186 takeover 
rumor (dropping 51 observations because of no dark pool participation, and 1 observation because 
the trades did not move the market) from 2006 to 2010. Time period: the rumor date or the next 
trading day if the rumor date is not a trading day. 
 
Dark Pools     
Trade 
size  Percent of total Percent of total 
(shares)  share volume cumulative change 




 200 2.47% 3.15% 
 300 1.64% 1.31% 
 400 1.31% 0.73% 




 600-900 2.59% 0.97% 
 1000-1900 4.13% 0.98% 
 2000-4900 3.68% 0.49% 
 5000-9900 1.58% 0.15% 




 20000-49900 1.18% 0.02% 
 50000 and over 2.60% 0.01% 
 Total 28.90% 28.90% 20.43% 20.43% 
      
Open markets     
Trade 
size  Percent of total Percent of total 
(shares)  share volume cumulative change 




 200 9.17% 10.03% 
 300 5.20% 4.04% 
 400 3.82% 1.94% 




 600-900 5.99% 2.01% 
 1000-1900 6.25% 1.54% 
 2000-4900 5.28% 0.67% 
 5000-9900 2.44% 0.19% 




 20000-49900 1.16% 0.02% 
 50000 and over 1.26% 0.01% 




Mean percentage of total share volume and mean percentage of total cumulative stock-price change 
by trade size in different quartiles of firm size and different venues. Summary results of trades 
classified as small (100 to 400 shares) and all trading size are in bold. Sample: Sample: 1100 
takeover rumor (dropping 86 observations because of a lack of firm size data) from 2006 to 2010. 




Dark pools     
Firm size    N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
quartiles   share volume cumulative change 
0%-25% Q1 275 Small  10.39% 17.46% 
  Medium  13.57% 3.50% 
  Large  4.73% 0.06% 
     
25%-50% Q2 275 Small  10.51% 15.29% 
  Medium  14.21% 3.50% 
  Large  4.73% 0.07% 
     
50%-75% Q3 275 Small  10.67% 16.57% 
  Medium  12.64% 2.95% 
  Large  5.09% 0.04% 
     
75%-100% Q4 275 Small  11.04% 19.11% 
  Medium  13.51% 3.07% 
  Large  4.51% 0.06% 
     
Open markets     
Firm size    N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
quartiles   share volume cumulative change 
0%-25% Q1 275 Small  44.09% 71.46% 
  Medium  23.02% 7.43% 
  Large  4.21% 0.10% 
     
25%-50% Q2 275 Small  43.58% 74.04% 
  Medium  23.50% 7.03% 
  Large  3.48% 0.07% 
     
50%-75% Q3 275 Small  45.39% 74.37% 
  Medium  22.72% 6.02% 
  Large  3.48% 0.05% 
     
75%-100% Q4 275 Small  42.50% 73.68% 
  Medium  24.22% 3.94% 




Mean percentage of total share volume and mean percentage of total cumulative stock-price change 
by trade size in different quartile of ROA and different venues. Summary results of trades classified 
as small (100 to 400 shares) and all trading size are in bold. Sample: 1100 takeover rumor (dropped 
86 observations because a lack of ROA data) from 2006 to 2010. Time period: the rumor date or 




Dark pools     
ROA    N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
quartiles   share volume cumulative change 
0%-25% Q1 275 Small  10.77% 18.58% 
  Medium  13.19% 2.35% 
  Large  4.50% 0.07% 
     
25%-50% Q2 275 Small  10.43% 15.61% 
  Medium  12.76% 3.01% 
  Large  4.88% 0.05% 
     
50%-75% Q3 275 Small  10.42% 17.37% 
  Medium  14.84% 3.79% 
  Large  4.46% 0.07% 
     
75%-100% Q4 275 Small  11.01% 16.95% 
  Medium  13.12% 3.85% 
  Large  5.21% 0.04% 
     
Open markets     
ROA N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
quartiles   share volume cumulative change 
0%-25% Q1 275 Small  44.36% 72.34% 
  Medium  23.05% 6.59% 
  Large  4.13% 0.08% 
     
25%-50% Q2 275 Small  44.29% 73.96% 
  Medium  24.03% 7.31% 
  Large  3.60% 0.07% 
     
50%-75% Q3 275 Small  42.32% 71.25% 
  Medium  23.84% 7.41% 
  Large  4.13% 0.11% 
     
75%-100% Q4 275 Small  44.59% 76.00% 
  Medium  22.53% 3.07% 




Mean percentage of total share volume and mean percentage of total cumulative stock-price change 
by trade size in different rumor accuracy and different venues. Summary results of trades classified 
as small (100 to 400 shares) and all trading size are in bold. Sample: 1186 takeover rumor (dropping 
51 observations because of no dark pool participation, and 1 observation because the trades did not 
move the market) from 2006 to 2010. Time period: the rumor date or the next trading day if the 
rumor date is not a trading day. 
 
 
Dark pools     
Rumor    N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
Accuracy   share volume cumulative change 
Accurate at 6 months   168 Small  10.11% 17.27% 
  Medium  12.43% 3.56% 
  Large  5.69% 0.04% 
     
Inaccurate at 6 months 1018 Small  10.74% 17.09% 
  Medium  13.66% 3.20% 
  Large  4.61% 0.06% 
     
Accurate at 1 year   233 Small  10.21% 17.26% 
  Medium  13.11% 3.80% 
  Large  5.30% 0.05% 
     
Inaccurate at 1 year 953 Small  10.76% 17.09% 
  Medium  13.58% 3.12% 
  Large  4.63% 0.06% 
     
Open markets     
Rumor    N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
Accuracy   share volume cumulative change 
Accurate at 6 months   168 Small  40.30% 71.11% 
  Medium  26.31% 7.90% 
  Large  5.17% 0.11% 
     
Inaccurate at 6 months 1018 Small  44.47% 73.76% 
  Medium  22.88% 5.80% 
  Large  3.63% 0.08% 
     
Accurate at 1 year   233 Small  40.34% 71.06% 
  Medium  25.99% 7.74% 
  Large  5.05% 0.09% 
     
Inaccurate at 1 year 953 Small  44.75% 73.95% 
  Medium  22.73% 5.70% 




Mean percentage of total share volume and mean percentage of total cumulative stock-price change 
by trade size in different quantile of the relative dark pool trading volume and different venues. 
Summary results of trades classified as small (100 to 400 shares) and all trading size are in bold. 
Sample: 1186 takeover rumor (dropping 51 observations because of no dark pool participation, and 
1 observation because the trades did not move the market) from 2006 to 2010. Time period: the 
rumor date or the next trading day if the rumor date is not a trading day. 
 
 
Dark pools     
Volume     N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
quantiles   share volume cumulative change 
0%-25% Q1 296 Small  6.23% 8.99% 
  Medium  5.23% 1.24% 
  Large  1.65% 0.02% 
     
25%-50% Q2 297 Small  10.99 % 15.03% 
  Medium  9.47% 2.14% 
  Large  3.93% 0.01% 
     
50%-75% Q3 297 Small  12.86% 19.96% 
  Medium  14.16% 3.57% 
  Large  4.93% 0.09% 
     
75%-100% Q4 296 Small  12.54% 24.50% 
  Medium  25.06% 6.06% 
  Large  8.53% 0.11% 
     
Open markets     
Volume     N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
quantiles   share volume cumulative change 
0%-25% Q1 296 Small  51.81% 80.34% 
  Medium  29.73% 9.29% 
  Large  5.35% 0.12% 
     
25%-50% Q2 297 Small  49.39% 80.05% 
  Medium  22.48% 2.69% 
  Large  3.73% 0.08% 
      
50%-75% Q3 297 Small  43.57% 70.36% 
  Medium  21.07% 5.96% 
  Large  3.42% 0.05% 
     
75%-100% Q4 296 Small  30.78% 62.79% 
  Medium  20.18% 6.43% 




Mean percentage of total share volume and mean percentage of total cumulative stock-price change 
by trade size in different year. Summary results of trades classified as small (100 to 400 shares) 
and all trading size are in bold. Sample: 1186 takeover rumor (dropping 51 observations because 
of no dark pool participation, and 1 observation because the trades did not move the market) from 






Dark pools     
Year   N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
   share volume cumulative change 
2006 138 Small  5.57% 14.97% 
  All size  16.88% 18.16% 
     
2007 178 Small  6.56% 10.98% 
  All size  21.33% 13.42% 
     
2008 178 Small  11.16% 19.44% 
  All size  31.06% 22.74% 
     
2009 347 Small  12.43% 17.76% 
  All size  33.50% 22.01% 
     
2010 345 Small  12.74% 19.31% 
  All size  31.87% 22.18% 
     
Open markets     
Year  N Trade size Percent of total Percent of total 
   share volume cumulative change 
2006 138 Small  34.26% 66.71% 
  All size  83.12% 81.84% 
     
2007 178 Small  43.87% 77.41% 
  All size  78.67% 86.58% 
     
2008 178 Small  42.18% 75.33% 
  All size  68.94% 77.26% 
     
2009 347 Small  45.89% 73.02% 
  All size  66.50% 77.99% 
     
2010 345 Small  46.60% 73.34% 




Mean share volume in dark pools, mean share volume in open markets and percent of mean share 
volume in dark pools by trade size in different year. Summary results of trades classified as small 
(100 to 400 shares) and all trading size are in bold. Sample: 1186 takeover rumor (dropping 51 
observations because of no dark pool participation, and 1 observation because the trades did not 
move the market) from 2006 to 2010. Time period: the rumor date or the next trading day if the 





Year  N Trade size Mean share volume  Mean share volume  Percent of mean share 
   in dark pools in open markets volume in dark pools 
2006 138 Small  295552.68 1265726.40 18.93% 
  All size  1120261.33 4695964.70 19.26% 
      
2007 178 Small  345396.10 1919091.40 15.25% 
  All size  1418730.11 4506680.30 23.94% 
      
2008 178 Small  594337.02 2100061.32 22.06% 
  All size  1763195.66 3871007.95 31.29% 
      
2009 347 Small  661247.53 2456435.57 21.21% 
  All size  2476971.09 4410592.06 35.96% 
      
2010 345 Small  727944.06 2636275.92 21.64% 























The trend in equal weighted average percentage of total share volume and percentage of total 
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